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Abstract: The development of provably secure OS kernels represents a fundamen-
tal step in the creation of safe and secure systems. To this aim, we propose the notion
of protokernel and an implementation — the Pip protokernel — as a separation ker-
nel whose trusted computing base is reduced to its bare bones, essentially providing
separation of tasks in memory, on top of which non-influence can be proved. This
proof-oriented design allows us to formally prove separation properties on a con-
crete executable model very close to its automatically extracted C implementation.
Our design is shown to be realistic as it can execute isolated instances of a real-
time embedded system that has moreover been modified to isolate its own processes
through the Pip services.
Keywords: protokernel, memory isolation, formal proof, Coq
1 Introduction
The development of provably secure kernels addresses the trusted computing base (TCB) that has
privileged access to the hardware, thus playing a fundamental role in the development of secure
systems [AST06]. Making such development manageable and cost-effective remains a major
challenge in formal methods even after major breakthroughs [KEH+09, GSC+16]. Memory
management and isolation are at the core of the functionalities of separation kernels [Rus81,
ZSZL17], designed to ensure that users can access resources and communicate with each other
only according to a given security policy.
The centrality of memory management and access control provides our motivation for intro-
ducing the notion of protokernel, as a minimal separation kernel that in fact provides only ser-
vices related to virtual memory management and context switching between applications. In this
paper, we present the development and verification of the Pip protokernel [The17b], relying on
a comparatively lightweight approach, yet providing an efficient, real-world application. We use
Coq, a proof assistant based on the Calculus of Constructions [BC04], to develop the monadic,
executable model of the services on top of a hardware abstraction layer, and we prove security
properties based on a low-level memory isolation criterion, using Hoare logic [The17c]. The
model is then automatically translated to a small fragment of C, using an Haskell-implemented
translator [HO17].
Pip has been developed for industrial application as part of a European project1. Its devel-
opment relies on a proof-oriented design, narrowing the TCB needed to implement the kernel
services in a machine independent way on top of the hardware abstraction layer. This design,
1 This work was funded by the European Celtic-Plus Project ODSI C2014/2-12.
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minimalistic yet efficient, is the result of a collaborative effort with our colleagues from the op-
erating system community (cf. [BGI18, YGG+18, BJY+18] for benchmarks and more details)
to support on-demand secure isolation [The17a]. Crucially, Pip supports efficient memory man-
agement and a dynamic notion of memory separation based on a hierarchical TCB architecture,
allowing for isolated partitions to be created and removed after initialisation.
1.1 Contributions
In this paper, we report the formal verification viewpoint of the development of the Pip protok-
ernel. We present: 1) a Coq model that includes the relied-upon hardware components (memory
and MMU), an executable specification of the memory manager supporting hierarchical TCB,
and a highly modular API consisting of ten services; 2) a low-level specification of memory
isolation; 3) an abstract information flow model which allows us to prove a non-influence result;
4) a verification methodology based on a Hoare logic on top of an enhanced state monad, de-
signed to carry out well-structured proofs of memory isolation on the executable model; 5) the
application of this methodology to the verification of three of the API services.
1.2 Related work
The development of secure kernels has been a long-standing goal in the formal methods com-
munity [ZSZL17]. Memory separation in its basic form can be characterised in terms of access
control. Stronger notions of information flow separation have been introduced with the nonin-
terference property [GM82], ensuring that events are not leaked [Rus92], and the non-leakage
property [vO04], ensuring that data are not leaked. Early work on access control policies for
the UCLA security kernel [WKP80] focused on the verification of an abstract model, stressing
the much higher cost of verifying executable code. The notion of separation kernel, originally
introduced by Rushby [Rus81] to ensure information flow separation, is at the foundations of
security-oriented kernels based on the MILS architecture [AST06] and of safety-oriented ones
[ZSZL16].
SeL4 [KEH+09] is a microkernel of the L4 family formally verified in Isabelle-HOL. It pro-
vides virtual memory management, thread scheduling, inter-process communication and access
control. High-level verification is carried out using Hoare logic on a abstract model. An exe-
cutable specification that refines the abstract model is obtained by automated translation from
a Haskell prototype. The manually written C implementation is proved to refine the executable
specification using an automatic translation of C to Isabelle based on the semantics in [TKN07].
The refinement proofs are functional correctness ones, thus quite big, ensuring that the abstract
model provides a complete specification of the C behaviour. Security properties are proved rely-
ing on the abstract model and functional correctness [MMB+13].
PROSPER is a separation kernel that supports dataflow functionalities of the ARMv7 proces-
sor [DGK+13], including inter-partition communication, scheduling, and in an extended version
[SD14] direct memory access. Security properties have been proved in HOL4. Bisimulation is
used to carry higher-level proofs, based on an abstract model including communication channels,
over to a concrete one based on an intermediate language that represents the ARM instruction
set [FM10].
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CertiKOS [GSC+16] provides a certified programming method to formally develop kernels in
Coq, targeting an extension of CompCert Clight and assembly code [BL09]. The specification
approach is based on certified abstraction layers, corresponding to Clight external functions,
enhanced with a notion of abstract state, to allow for functional correctness specifications in the
code. CertiKOS supports fine-grained layering of programming and verification, relying on a
notion of contextual refinement [GKR+15], and it has also been used to prove noninterference
results [CSG16].
In [BBBT11] the PikeOS memory manager is verified at the C source code level using an
automated static verifier, proving that initialisation-time partitioning of memory is preserved at
runtime. In [BBCL11] a Xen-based paravirtualization-style hypervisor is abstractly modelled
in Coq and information flow separation is proved. In [ZSZL16] Isabelle-HOL is used to model
abstractly the ARINC-653 channel-based inter-partition communication for safety-oriented sep-
aration kernels. In [BCG+16] an abstract model of the Nova kernel is formalised in Coq, data se-
curity properties are proved, and program extraction is used to generate testing code. In [SBH14]
an abstract security model is formalised in Isabelle-HOL to verify properties of the XtratuM ker-
nel using refinements.
1.3 Pip
Our system relies on a notion of memory separation, on top of which noninterference can be
proved for isolated partitions. Inter-partition communication and scheduling are not part of Pip,
and therefore communication policies are not part of the kernel TCB. On the other hand, Pip
allows for partition reconfiguration at runtime, and tree-like partitioning can naturally support
any user TCB hierarchy. The security proof we provide does not rely on any specific architecture,
and has been the driving factor in the development. The verification of memory separation is
comparatively lightweight, and this has been achieved by avoiding to go through a full functional
correctness proof. From the development point of view, Pip relies on a separation of concerns
between modelling and verification on one side and translation to C on the other. Nonetheless,
unlike work based on abstract models, Pip provides an executable model of its services, written
in a shallow embedding of a small fragment of C. Indeed, our Coq development is based on a
direct formalisation of the executable model, relying on consistency properties to capture the
abstract requirement in a bottom-up way, following the approach already used in [JNGH18] for
a simpler system with a flat memory model. The translation of the service layer to C source code
is fully automated, and its verification, on which the correctness of the model does not depend,
is under way as an independent workload (see [TNJC18] for more discussion of this point).
1.4 Outline
In Section 2 we present the design of Pip. In Section 3 we present the Coq model, including
hardware components and partitioning manager. In Section 4 we present the security properties
and the abstract information flow model. In Section 5 we present the isolation proofs and the
underlying methodology. Conclusions and further work are discussed in Section 6.
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2 Proof-oriented design
Pip is a kind of security kernel conveniently described as a protokernel [The17b, BJY+18,
BIG17], designed to minimize the TCB. The goal of such minimization is twofold: to reduce the
attack surface, and to increase the feasibility of a formal proof. Pip only provides the hardware
management that suffices to enforce security in the form of memory separation: in this sense,
we speak of proof-oriented design, emphasising the feedback of theorem-proving in the iterative
development of the system. Like exokernels [EKO95], Pip does not offer any higher-level ab-
straction: in particular, it offers neither threads, nor processes, nor a file-system, nor a network
stack. Pip provides a runtime environment that is a kind of virtual machine and that we call a
partition. On top of that we can implement any high-level abstraction. Each partition allows
configuring a virtual memory management unit (MMU) and managing virtual interrupt request
(IRQ) via dedicated Pip services that form the Pip API. Using these configuration services, it is
possible to port on Pip a conventional kernel (e.g. Linux) as well as an embedded system (e.g.
FreeRTOS) or even a hypervisor (e.g. Xen). Little effort is needed to adapt one of them to run as
a partition (see [BJY+18] for details, including more than satisfactory benchmarks), relying on
the paravirtualization approach [BDF+03].
Pip can be better described as protokernel rather than hypervisor because it does not include
multiplexing management, thus reducing the kernel TCB to its bare bone. Indeed, in a sense Pip
runs a single primary partition. This partition, created at boot time, represents the whole and
only real machine. Pip assigns to it the entire address space (except for the memory used by Pip
itself) and the whole CPU time (except for the CPU time spent by Pip to handle real IRQs).
Nonetheless, Pip supports a hierarchical partitioning model, allowing each partition to create
its own subpartitions and split part of its own address space between them. This recursively
results in the creation of a partition tree whose root is the primary one (henceforth the root
partition). The management of the partition tree takes place according to a recursive scheme.
Only one partition can be executing at each time in a monocore system, but Pip does neither
multiplex interrupt requests nor share CPU time between distinct partitions. Pip only deals with
software interrupts that are system calls to its own API. Other software interrupts are forwarded
to the parent of the caller. On the other hand, all the hardware interrupts are forwarded to the root.
In this way, Pip delegates multiplexing (i.e. determining the control flow between partitions)
to the root, which can implement any possible multiplexing policy, recursively allowing each
partition to share CPU time between its children.
Executing multiplexing in user mode allows us to cut drastically the size of the kernel TCB.
On the other hand, the hierarchical architecture allows each partition to rely on the environment
managed by its parent and to split its environment between its children. This naturally induces a
hierarchical characterisation of the TCB associated with each partition, which can be expressed
in terms of a simple transitive policy: each partition only relies on its ancestors and the kernel.
The primary purpose of this design is to allow for a cost-effective verification that this policy is
enforced, by means of a memory isolation proof.
The memory isolation property ensured by Pip is based on hardware functionalities that con-
trol physical memory accesses. Partitions can not use physical addresses: in order to access
information they can only use virtual addresses that will be converted to physical ones using the
Memory Management Unit. Each partition has an MMU configuration, and on every user access,
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the MMU is invoked to decide on whether authorising or rejecting the access. These decisions
are based on the configuration pages, called page tables or indirections, written by the kernel so
as to allow translation of any given virtual address to the corresponding physical address. In or-
der to guarantee security, page tables should never be accessible by any entity except the kernel.
Pip satisfies this requirement by construction.
Partitioning model
The physical memory of a computer is split into fixed-size chunks called pages which can be
allocated, accessed and used to store information. Whenever a partition is created, Pip associates
it with a page which we call its partition descriptor (PD), denoted by an identifier referred to as
PDI.
The memory is split between primary kernel pages, solely accessible by the kernel, and user
pages, initially assigned to the root partition and accessible by it. When a partition creates a
child in the course of its execution, it allocates some of its accessible pages exclusively for that
child; in particular, the executing partition hands over to the kernel the sole accessibility of some
of the newly allocated pages, to be used for the configuration of the newly created partition; the
remaining of those pages, already assigned to the parent are also assigned to the child. In line
with the hierarchical model, the executing partition can always delete a child (and with it its
descendants). When this happens, the parent regains accessibility to the configuration pages of
the descendants. Notice that in general, the pages a partition can access are a subset of those
assigned to it. We refer to the pages assigned to a partition together with those used for its
configuration as the pages allocated for that partition.
The API of Pip is constituted of ten services that can be called by the executing partition,
eight of which are for managing its memory space. createPartition adds a new child to the caller.
deletePartition deletes a child and gives all the pages allocated for it back to the caller. addVaddr
lends physical memory to a child. removeVaddr removes a page from a child. mappedInChild
returns the child to which a given page is assigned. prepare gives pages to the kernel to manage
a child’s configuration. pageCount computes the number of pages required to configure a child.
collect gives pages lent to the kernel back to the calling partition. The remaining two services
are for handling IRQs. dispatch notifies a partition about a given interrupt. resume restores the
context of a previously interrupted partition.
Fig. 1 serves to illustrate partition management in Pip: the available memory makes up the root
partition Proot. User code running in any partition can use the memory management services
exposed by Pip to create child partitions, here P1 and P2, lending some of its accessible pages to
each of them. For instance, code running in P1 can create P1.1 using available memory in P1.
While the parent partition can read and write in the memory accessible by its children (we call
this property vertical sharing), it cannot access anymore to the pages given to Pip (we obviously
want to prevent a partition from messing up Pip data structures, we call this property kernel iso-
lation). Sibling partitions (i.e. partitions that have the same parent) cannot access each other’s
memory (we call this property horizontal isolation). If siblings want to communicate, they can-
not do it through shared memory. Instead, their parent can use the services of Pip to implement
a communication protocol, for instance by flipping a memory page between the siblings.
For example, as result of horizontal isolation, the partition P1 in Figure 1 is disjoint from the
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Figure 1: An example of partition tree
partition P2. Thus, code running in the partition P1 cannot access the memory in the partition
P2. Moreover, since partitions P1.1 and P1.2 are included in the partition P1, they are also disjoint
from the partition P2. However their parent partition P1 can access their memory and the memory
of their descendant partitions P1.1.1, . . . , P1.2.2 as result of vertical sharing.
3 The executable specification
The development of Pip is based on a layered model formalised in Coq, as shown in Fig. 2. At the
top level, the service layer provides a source-code level executable specification of architecture-
independent system management functions. The service layer consists of the kernel service API
that allows for context switching and partition tree management (PTM) which is the core of the
Pip engine. The service layer is implemented as an algorithmic model, using the shallow embed-
ding of a C-like fragment based on a monadic encoding, which can be automatically translated to
C code. The service layer is built on top of a hardware abstraction layer (HAL), including mem-
ory abstraction (MAL) and interrupt abstraction (IAL). The MAL itself can be structured into
two layers: hardware memory abstraction (HMAL) and monadic memory abstraction (MMAL).
The HMAL provides an abstract model of the physical memory and the MMU. The IAL is
also structured into two layers: hardware interrupts abstraction layer (HIAL) and monadic inter-
rupts abstraction layer (MIAL) required to perform context switching. The MMAL and MIAL
provide high-level but executable specifications of low-level, architecture-dependent functions
which have been manually implemented in C and assembly. The executable model that can be
actually run in Coq thus includes the algorithmic model of the service layer as well as the MMAL
and MIAL.















Figure 2: The design of Pip
3.1 Hardware memory abstraction layer
Memory size is determined in our model by two architecture-dependent parameters, the positive
integers pageSize for memory page size and nmbPages for the number of pages. Pages are
pointed to by page identifiers of type page, which are natural numbers less than nmbPages,
modelled in Coq using dependent records and defined as {p :> nat; Hp: p < nmbPages}.
We use 0 as default value for the identifier that points to the null page. The physical address of
a memory cell consists of a page identifier and a position in that page, given as an offset value
called index. It is modelled by type paddr and defined as (page * index). Also indices are
typed as a subset of positive integers index and defined as {i:> nat; Hi: i< pageSize}.
In general, the physical memory state of a computer can be modelled as an association list
which maps physical addresses to values. However, our model is completely abstract with respect
to the content of the user space. We only need to model the partition tree, and thus we only
provide the content of the kernel-owned pages, from which the tree structure can be computed.
The part of the hardware state that is relevant to Pip consists of the partition descriptor of the
currently executing partition and of the parts of the physical memory where Pip stores its own
data (essentially related to the configuration and management of the partition tree), as expressed
by the record type state which is defined as:
Record state: Type:={ currentPartition: page;
memory: list(paddr * value)}.
Direct memory access is represented by a lookup function named select. The value datatype
sums up the types of values that can be stored by Pip.
Inductive value : Type:= |PE: Pentry → value |VE: Ventry → value
|PP: page → value |VA: vaddr → value |I: index → value.
Here Pentry stands for physical entry, Ventry for virtual entry, and vaddr for virtual address.
We prove that memory management is well-typed with respect to these value types, as an in-
variant consistency property of our model. Physical entries (PTEs) make it possible to associate
page addresses with information concerning whether each page is assigned to the current parti-
tion (present) and whether it is owned by it (accessible). A physical entry is modelled by
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Figure 3: Partition tree configuration
type Pentry and defined as {pa: page; present: bool; accessible: bool}. A page
table is a configuration page that contains a set of values, including physical entries.
3.2 Partition tree management
The configuration of each partition (other than the root) is stored in the memory allocated for it
by its parent partition, thus assigned to the parent, though in the part of it that is only accessible to
the kernel, and it is defined by four entities. The first and principal one is the MMU configuration,
the other ones include two tree-like structures and a list-like one. Each partition descriptor (PD)
is a page that contains the addresses of four configuration entities, as illustrated by Fig. 3. The
PD together with its entities forms what we call a configuration node.
The MMU configuration of each partition has a hierarchical structure that can be abstractly
described as a graph where nodes are pages, each being either a page table or a terminal page, and
each terminal page being either a page assigned to the configured partition or the null page. Each
entry in a page table points to another page, thus providing the arcs in the graph, while providing
accessibility information. The MMU structure has two fundamental properties which have been
verified as invariant consistency properties of our model. The first property ensures that the one
and only physical entry marked as not present corresponds to the null page – in fact, the MMU
configuration only contains pages that are assigned to the parent partition. The second property
ensures that the subgraph formed by non-null pages has the structure of a tree, which we call the
MMU tree. The tree depth is fixed by the architecture-dependent natural parameter levelNum.
Virtual addresses are modelled by type vaddr as lists of indices of length levelNum+1 and
defined as:
Record vaddr := {va :> list index; Hva: length va = levelNum + 1}.
Each virtual address is translated either to the null address or to a physical address in a leaf, by
interpreting each index in the list as offset in the page table at the corresponding level in the MMU
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tree. The last index in the list is the offset of the corresponding physical address, which may be
accessible or not to the partition, depending on whether the page is owned or not, as specified
by the last PTE. Crucially, in Pip only the kernel can access directly physical addresses. Virtual
addresses are the objects provided by the MMU to user applications as indirect references to
the physical memory. Indirect access relies on the mmu_translate function, which models the
hardware mapping of virtual addresses to physical ones, and which has been proved to respect
the access policy.
Intuitively, non-null virtual addresses correspond to maximal branches in the MMU tree (plus
the final offset), and they include those pointing to the descendants in the partition tree. In fact,
the content of a virtual address (i.e. the value of the physical address it gets translated to) can be
the PDI of another partition (indeed, this is the only kind of content Pip cares for). In this way
configuration nodes can be linked together. The resulting structure is a graph which we prove
to be a tree, and thus to represent the partition tree, as an invariant consistency property of our
model.
The partition tree management makes use of two auxiliary configuration entities, called shad-
ows, that mirror the corresponding MMU tree. The first shadow is used to find out which pages
are assigned to children, an information that is needed to ensure horizontal isolation. It uses the
type Ventry of virtual entries which is defined using the following record:
Record Ventry : Type:={pd: bool; va: vaddr}.
The flag pd indicates if the associated physical address is the PDI of a child partition. The
second shadow is used to associate each partition descriptor to the virtual address it has in its
parent partition. The fourth auxiliary entity is a linked list used to remember which pages have
been lent to the kernel. The information in the second shadow and in the linked list is needed to
process efficiently the deletion of a partition.
3.3 The monad
In order to implement the Pip services imperatively in Coq as sequential programs, we rely on
a monadic approach. Monads [Mog91, Wad92] allow threading effects through computations,
and can be used to interpret semantically imperative languages in purely functional ones. In our
case, side effects include the state, corresponding to the hardware state, and a notion of exception
corresponding to the possibility of undefined behaviours that we actually prove to never happen.
For example, any attempt by Pip to access a physical address that is not defined in the memory
state would result in an undefined behaviour.
We define our monad (Low Level Interface monad) as an abstract datatype LLI A that wraps
together hardware state and undefined behaviours, following [Mog91, Wad92].
Definition LLI (A : Type) : Type := state → result (A * state).
Here result is an inductive type with two constructors: the first one corresponds to a result
of type A, and the second one to an undefined behaviour.
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Inductive result (A : Type) : Type :=
|val: A → result A |undef: nat → state → result A.
We define the monadic operations ret and bind, which can be easily proved to satisfy the
monadic laws [Mog91, Wad92].
Definition ret : A → LLI A := fun a s ⇒ val (a, s).
Definition bind : LLI A → (A → LLI B) → LLI B :=
fun m f s ⇒ match m s with
|val (a, s’) ⇒ f a s’ |undef a s’ ⇒ undef a s’ end.
We write perform x := m in e for the monadic binding operation bind m (fun x ⇒ e),
which can also be written m ;; e when x is not used in e, to represent sequential composition
of the stateful actions m and e. The state monad ensures we can define the usual stateful func-
tions, e.g. get and put to read and update the state. We use the monadic functions to define
the specific ones that form the MAL, matching the corresponding architecture-dependent imple-
mentations in C and assembly. Crucially, the Pip services are implemented so to access the state
only through the MMAL functions.
3.4 Monadic memory abstraction layer
The MMAL specifies a C and assembly library for the architecture-dependent part of Pip, which
consists of kernel atomic operations, such as reading and writing values in physical memory,
and performing simple computations and comparisons on them. This includes physical memory
access operations needed to configure partitions, virtual memory activation and a set of auxiliary
operations. It mainly consists of bitwise operations of constant computational complexity.
The functions defined in the MMAL can be organized along four categories. The first one
is HAL_write, allowing the kernel to write values into physical memory through physical
addresses and including the primitives writeVirtual, writePhysical, writeVirEntry,
writePhyEntry, writeAccessible, writePresent, writePDflag, writeIndex. For
example, the writeVirtual primitive has the following definition:
Definition writeVirtual (addr:page)(idx:index)(va:vaddr): LLI unit:=
modify (fun s ⇒ {| currentPartition := s.(currentPartition); memory
:= add paddr idx (VA va) s.(memory) beqPage
beqIndex|}).
It stores a virtual address at the physical address given by a page and an index. The monadic
operator modify is used to modify the association list that represents the memory.
The second category is HAL_read. It is about reading values from physical memory and includes
the following primitives: readVirtual, readPhysical, readVirEntry, readPhyEntry,
readAccessible, readPresent, readPDflag, readIndex. For example, readVirtual
allows reading a virtual address from a physical location.
Definition readVirtual (p: page) (idx: index): LLI vaddr:=
perform s := get in
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match lookup p idx s.(memory) beqPage beqIndex with
|Some (VA v) ⇒ ret v |Some _ ⇒ undefined 3 |None ⇒ undefined 2
end.
This requires that there is a value of the right type at the given physical address. If the condition
is not met, the result is an undefined behaviour.
The third category (named HAL_op) allows the kernel to perform simple operations, includ-
ing e.g. successor and equality comparison, on each value type. The last category (named
HAL_const) is about accessing global constants. Notice that since Coq types are more discrim-
inating than C ones, different MMAL functions may be actually implemented as the same C
function.
3.5 Linguistic aspects
The program extraction capabilities of Coq made it possible to extract Haskell code which we
used to test our model. However, such code does not meet the runtime requirements of a realistic
kernel. The cost of the runtime environment needed by functional programs, and particularly
garbage collection, stand in the way of a reliable runtime behaviour. Therefore, we rely on a
translation to C. The monadic code we use in our executable specification corresponds to a quite
simple imperative language: essentially, a first-order sequential language with call-by-value,
primitive recursion and mutable references. From a low-level point of view, all the datastruc-
tures used by Pip, including trees, can be treated as linked lists. The abstract memory model
in Coq matches closely this low-level characterisation: Pip datastructures are represented using
an encoding of linked lists, given in terms of lists and access to the monadic state, rather than
by using specific inductive datatypes, and then by proving invariant consistency properties as
appropriate to ensure that the low-level representation is correct.
In fact, our monadic code corresponds to a shallow embedding of the denotational semantics
of a language, formally described in [TNJC18], which matches closely a comparatively small
fragment of C (we use no arrays, neither structures nor unions, no loop instructions, no pointer
arithmetics). We use a Haskell-implemented tool called Digger [HO17] to generate automati-
cally C code for the service layer from the abstract syntax of the monadic Coq code. The code
generated by Digger from the executable model can then be compiled (we currently use GCC)
together with the manually implemented MAL functions.
Relying on a low-level modelling of data structures has a drawback in the development of
recursive functions based on such structures: we cannot rely on structural recursion as Coq
would provide for the corresponding inductive type. This can be a problem already at the level
of function definition, as Coq requires that we ensure termination. Nonetheless, we can easily
deal with this issue, relying on the fact that Pip functions only require recursion bounded by
parameters of the hardware architecture such as the size of a memory page. However, this means
we need to prove that fuel suffices, for each top-level function call.
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4 Security properties
Security in Pip relies on the MMU functionalities that control user access to physical memory, as
user access to physical memory is only allowed through the MMU. Proved consistency properties
ensure, for instance, that the MMU is configured correctly, consistently with the partition tree,
and that memory access through the MMU is consistent with the access policy encoded in the
configuration pages. Such properties are needed to prove the actual security properties of Pip.
We now introduce the main properties that define the Pip partitioning model, provably preserved
by the API services: horizontal isolation, kernel isolation, and vertical sharing.
In a tree, two nodes are unrelated whenever neither of them is a descendant of the other one.
With respect to the partition tree, horizontal isolation means that unrelated partitions cannot
access each other’s memory. This is the case in particular for sibling partitions.
Definition 1 (HI) Horizontal isolation holds for a state s whenever for all partition descriptors
m0,m1,m2 ∈ partition tree(s), with m1,m2 ∈ children(m0,s) and pdi(m1) 6= pdi(m2), it holds
that
allocated pages(m1,s) ∩ allocated pages(m2,s) = /0.
where partition tree is the list of partition identifiers. We use consistency properties to ensure
that partitions are organized into a tree-like structure.
Kernel isolation means that no partition can access the pages owned by the kernel.
Definition 2 (KI) Kernel isolation holds for a state s whenever for each partition descriptor
m ∈ partition tree(s), it holds that
accessible pages(m,s) ∩ kernel owned pages(s) = /0.
Vertical sharing means that all the pages allocated for a partition are included in the pages
assigned to its ancestors, and therefore, owing to the access policy implemented by the MMU, a
partition has read and write access on all the memory accessible by its descendants.
Definition 3 (VS) Vertical sharing holds for a state s whenever for all partitions m0,m1 ∈
partition tree(s), with m1 ∈ children(m0,s), it holds that
allocated pages(m1,s)⊂ assigned pages(m0,s).
Relying on these invariants we can prove formally a non-influence property for isolated parti-
tions [The17d] (i.e. excluding inter-partition communication), relying on an abstract information
flow model. We call P-machine a state machine at the level of physical memory, where transi-
tion steps are specified by the type pstep (ls : list page) : state→ state . Here ls is the list of
pages which can be accessed in the execution of the physical action associated with the step. We
can define state equivalence with respect to a list of pages (where select returns the value stored
at a location).
s1 ∼ps s2 := ∀(p : page) (i : index), p ∈ ps→ select s1 p i = select s2 p i
We write s1 ∼ s2 for s1 ∼ps s2 when ps are all the pages, and s1 ∼p s2 for s1 ∼[p] s2. We can
specify the access requirement intended by pstep in terms of two conditions. First, the read
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condition states that the step depends only on the values read at locations in ps (i.e. the physical
action depends only on its accessible locations).
readCond (pi : pstep) : Type :=
∀(ps : list page) (s1 s2 : state), s1 ∼ps s2 → pi ps s1 ∼ps pi ps s2
Second, the write condition states that the only locations possibly affected by the step are those
in ps (i.e. the physical action only affects its accessible locations).
writeCond (pi : pstep) : Type :=
∀(ps : list page) (s : state) (p : page), ¬ p ∈ ps → s ∼p pi ps s
Any state machine can be modelled as a P-machine. Runs can be modelled as action sequences.
We can now introduce V-machines as virtual-level state machines which lift our information flow
specification at the level of virtual memory. We can define the notion of virtual step by lifting a
physical step, relying on the MMU translation function that represents virtual memory access in
the HAL. Here m is the executing partition and vs is the list of virtual addresses accessed in the
execution of the virtual action associated with the step.
vstep (p : page) (pi : pstep) (vs : list vaddr) (s : state) : state :=
let ps := map (mmu translate p) vs in pi ps s
The fact that the MMU is configured to return physical addresses in the memory owned by
the executing partition, together with the access requirement on the P-machine steps, makes it
straightforward in Coq to prove non-influence (a notion defined in [vO04]), with respect to a
policy that excludes communication between separated partitions.
We write @m to denote all the pages that are in a partition with address m. We write s1∼m!ps s2
whenever s1 ∼ps s2, the executing PDI is m in both states, and s1 ∼@m s2. We prove stepwise
non-leakage, defined following [vO04].
s1 ∼a!as s2 → ∀pt vs, vstep a pt vs s1 ∼as vstep a pt vs s2
This property can be easily extended to action sequences. Similarly we can prove a noninterference-
related property (called local-respect in [Rus92]).
¬ a ∈@ax → ∀pt vs, vstep ax pt vs s∼a s
This, together with non-leakage suffices to prove classical noninterference and non-influence
[Rus92, vO04]. Our proof shows how the low-level invariants (HI, KI and VS) can be used to
prove a higher-level result. The extent of the result presented here is comparatively limited, as
we consider a definition of virtual step which is very strict, ruling out the mechanism we need for
inter-partition communication (i.e. interrupts). On the other hand, this model could be extended
to deal with given user-level communication policies, by a reformulation of the write condition
that takes interrupts into account.
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5 The verification approach
5.1 Hoare logic on top of a state monad
Our verification targets the properties KI, HI and VS, defined in Section 4, as well as the consis-
tency properties (which we will denote jointly by C in the following), with the goal of ensuring
that each system call to an API service preserves all of them. Thus our proofs consist mainly of
reasoning about invariants. We do this by using a Hoare logic which we define on top of the LLI
monad. We use the syntax {{ P }} m {{ Q }} for our Hoare triples, defined as follows.
Definition hoareTriple {A: Type} (P: state → Prop) (m: LLI A)
(Q: A → state → Prop): Prop :=
∀ s, P s → match m s with
|val (a,s’) ⇒ Q a s’ |undef _ _⇒ False
end.
Here the unary predicate P gives the precondition and the binary predicate Q the postcondition
of running the computation m. If performing m yields an undefined behavior, the triple does
not hold, thus ensuring a basic functional correctness property: the services of Pip never lead
to an undefined behavior. We created a library of general Hoare logic rules to reason about
monadic programs. We also created a specific library of Hoare triples (in general, either weakest
preconditions or strongest postconditions) for the MAL primitives that sequentially form each
of the API service. For example, the following has the weakest precondition of readVirtual as
precondition.
Lemma readVirtualWP table idx (P : vaddr → state → Prop) :
{{fun s⇒ exists e: vaddr,
lookup table idx s.(memory) beqPage beqIndex = Some (VA e) ∧
P e s}} MAL.readVirtual table idx {{P}}.
Our use of Hoare logic relies on the assumption that each system call is atomic: it is required
that interrupts are blocked during a system call. This is one of the reasons the system calls
were designed to be elementary. Moreover, our Hoare logic deals only with the global state,
therefore it is required that in multicore architectures at most one core is executing a system call
at any time. Concerning the hardware, we naturally assume that the physical memory behaves
correctly, as specified (i.e. essentially it is not volatile), and that so does the MMU component.
We also assume that the non-algorithmic MMAL is correctly implemented in C and assembly,
and that the system was booted in an isolated and consistent state (as our proof is essentially a
preservation one).
The code of Pip has a sequential character. Thus, verification can proceed backward, relying
on weakest precondition triples, or forward relying on strongest postcondition ones. The two
approaches are actually equivalent in our case, since we can ensure termination and our triples
rule out undefined behaviours. In our concrete proofs we found it more convenient to move
forward, following the actual execution flow.
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5.2 The separation proof for addVaddr
In the case of AddVaddr, the top level invariant is the following:
Lemma addVaddrInvariant (src dst child: vaddr):
{{fun s ⇒ HI s ∧ KI s ∧ VS s ∧ C s}} addVaddr src dst child
{{fun _ s ⇒ HI s ∧ KI s ∧ VS s ∧ C s }}.
The AddVaddr service is called by the executing partition p0 to assign one of its pages (further
down denoted by srcp) to one of its children (child). Here src is the virtual address of srcp
in the address space of p0, whereas dst is the virtual address that gets associated with srcp in
the address space of child. The first part of the service consists in making some checks, before
making any update to the state. These checks include consistency ones needed to avoid undefined
behaviours, and security ones on each of the given parameters. If any of the security checks fails,
the service will abort leaving the state unchanged. To ensure that child is actually a child of p0,
AddVaddr starts by checking if the PDI of child is included in the first shadow of p0. Then it
makes sure that srcp is already assigned to p0 and accessible by it, checking the control bits
present and accessible of the corresponding table entry in the MMU tree of p0. It checks that
srcp is not already assigned to any child using the flag pd stored in the first shadow of p0. Finally
it verifies that dst is not already associated to a physical page by going through the MMU tree
of child. This prevents overwriting data. These properties gets propagated through the sequential
execution until the last part, where state updates take place. In fact, it is part of our design of
the Pip services to carry out state updates in a way that maximises invariant propagation without
compromising efficiency. In the case of AddVaddr state updates are confined to the last three
instructions, for which the following triple holds:
{{fun s ⇒ HI s ∧ KI s ∧ VS s ∧ C s ∧ isChild child s ∧
isPresent srcp s ∧ isAccessible srcp s ∧
notShared srcp s ∧ isEmpty dst s}}
writeVirtual shadow2TableDst dst src;;
writeVirEntry shodow1TableSrc dst child;;
writePhyEntry MMUtableDst dst srcp
{{fun _ s ⇒ HI s ∧ KI s ∧ VS s ∧ C s}}.
writeVirtual modifies the second shadow of child, by storing src at dst (thus ensuring that
the page can be efficiently located in the parent address space when it needs to get revoked).
writeVirEntry starts the process of assigning the page associated with src to the partition asso-
ciated with child, by storing the address child at src in the first shadow of p0. writePhyEntry
concludes the process, by associating the physical page srcp to dst in the MMU tree of child.
As a result of relying on comparatively flat representations (e.g. our trees are represented using
lists), a significant part of the proof consists of ensuring that consistency properties are preserved
through sequential updates. This is particularly the case for the consistency of the first shadow, a
data structure which has been specifically put in place to support isolation, by ensuring that a page
cannot be assigned to distinct children. Our policy of ordering steps to maximise propagation
pays with respect to several properties: for example accessibleChildPageIsAccessibleIntoParent,
15 / 20 Volume 076 (2019)
Proof-Oriented Design of a Separation Kernel with Minimal Trusted Computing Base
requiring that each page assigned to a partition has a back-pointer in its second shadow, is pre-
served by the fact of performing writeVirtual first. However, there are some propagated proper-
ties that get temporarily broken and need to be patched up with weaker ones. For example, the
property notShared srcp s, stating that srcp is not marked as shared according to the kernel infor-
mation stored at p0, is no more valid after executing writeVirEntry. Luckily, a weaker property
that here we denote H holds. It states that srcp is not assigned to any child according to MMU
configuration, and suffices to prove the final triple:
{{fun s ⇒ HI s∧ KI s ∧ VS s ∧ C s ∧ isChild child s ∧
isPresent srcp s ∧ isAccessible srcp s ∧
H srcp s ∧ isEmpty dst s}}
writePhyEntry MMUtableDst idx srcp
{{fun _ s ⇒ HI s ∧ KI s ∧ VS s ∧ C s}}.
In particular, proving HI s (as by definition 1) involves showing that srcp is assigned to child and
not assigned to any distinct sibling partition. Proving KI s (as by definition 2) involves showing
that srcp is not a kernel page. Finally proving VS s (as by definition 3) involves showing that srcp
is assigned to the parent partition of child.
5.3 Overview of the development and the verification
The top level executable specification includes about 1300 lines of Gallina. We estimate 3 months
for kernel conception and 9 months for its development. We have currently verified three ser-
vices: createPartition, addVaddr and mappedInChild. We started from the proof of createPar-
tition which introduced the majority of the consistency properties resulting in about 60K lines
of proof as detailed in table 1. The other two services were proved relying largely on lemmas
already proved for createPartition and resulting in about 20K additional lines of proof. The cur-
rent proof has required about one person-year of verification time. Along the proof, we made
several changes to the code of the kernel. Most of time it was about fixing bugs such as adding
some missing checks or reordering instructions to simplify the proof.
Invariants Lines of proof duration
createPartition (≈ 300loc) ≈ 60000 ≈ 10 months
createPartition + addVaddr (≈ 110loc) ≈ 78000 ≈ 2 monthes
createPartition + addVaddr + mappedInChild (≈ 40loc) ≈ 78300 ≈ 4 hours
Table 1: The overview of verification
6 Conclusions and further work
In this paper we have presented the formalization of the protokernel Pip which is written in Coq
and automatically translated to C code. It supports a hierarchical partitioning model that only
requires managing partition virtual spaces and context switching. The main security property
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ensured by the kernel is memory separation. Pip was designed with special attention to increas-
ing the feasibility of its verification. In this sense, not only the minimisation of the TCB, but
also the modular design of the API, the structuring of the configuration information, and the
modelling economy of the monadic encoding have played a role in allowing for comparatively
simple proofs.
Applications
In order to show that our proof-oriented design is realistic, the real-time embedded system FreeR-
TOS and Linux 4.10.4 have been ported to Pip [YGG+18, BJY+18]. The porting consists essen-
tially in removing privileged instructions and other operations, replacing them with system calls
to Pip, thus allowing for isolating tasks by running them in isolated partitions. Pip has also been
extended to support different multi-core configurations [BGI18], and this has been possible with-
out changing its current implementation. The modification of existing proofs on the mono-core
version to account this extension is still under study.
Translations to C and DEC
A verified translation to C of the service layer is currently being implemented, following one
of the work plans discussed in [TNJC18], relying on a small intermediate language called DEC
[TN17] which has been formalised as a deep embedding to allow for a definition in Coq of a
translation to CompCert C [BL09]. The Digger translator [HO17], which works on the AST of
the shallow embedding and is currently used to obtain uncertified C code, can also be used to
translate automatically the service layer to DEC. Ongoing work is focusing on proving the ade-
quacy of the deep embedding with respect to the shallow one. In [TNJC18] the deep embedding
has also been used to experiment with syntax-driven semi-automation of Hoare logic proofs.
Ongoing and future work
Concerning the formal track, the verification of the remaining services is currently under way,
and so is the verification of the translation to C. Future work could involve, on one hand, extend-
ing the information flow model to deal with user-level interpartition communication, and on the
other hand, extending verification to the architecture-dependent part.
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